Détente and the Long Stalemate: Accommodation Without Resolution

By the late 1960s, both superpowers had reason to want relief from the cost and tension of unrelenting competition. The United States was exhausted by Vietnam, politically fractured, and watching its economic dominance erode. The Soviet Union had achieved rough nuclear parity but faced a stagnating economy, a worsening split with China, and the suppression of Prague Spring in 1968 — which crushed Czechoslovakia's experiment in reform and exposed the brittleness of the Soviet bloc's political model. Out of mutual exhaustion came détente: a managed relaxation of tensions that acknowledged the Cold War's permanence while trying to reduce its dangers.

The Nixon administration drove American détente policy from 1969 onward, with Henry Kissinger as its primary architect. The strategy had several elements. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks produced the SALT I agreement in 1972, which capped certain categories of nuclear missiles for the first time. Nixon's visit to China in February 1972 — a landmark in its own right — realigned the strategic triangle between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing. Since the Sino-Soviet split had begun in the early 1960s, the United States could now play the two Communist powers against each other. Improved relations with China gave Moscow an additional reason to moderate its behavior toward Washington.

In Europe, West Germany's Ostpolitik policy — associated with Chancellor Willy Brandt — pursued normalized relations with East Germany and the Soviet bloc. The Helsinki Accords of 1975 formalized the postwar European borders, which amounted to Western recognition that the Soviet sphere of influence was real and would not be forcibly reversed. In exchange, the Soviet bloc signed onto human rights provisions that dissidents and activists would later invoke to great effect.

Détente was always a limited and contested project. Its critics in the United States argued that it legitimized Soviet power without producing genuine behavioral change, and that American concessions were more real than Soviet ones. In the Soviet Union, détente was understood as recognition of superpower equality, not as a commitment to liberalize domestic politics. The Soviets continued to support revolutionary movements in Africa and elsewhere throughout the 1970s — Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique — which American hardliners viewed as exploitation of American restraint.

The final blow to détente came on December 25, 1979, when Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan to prop up a failing Communist government in Kabul. The Carter administration responded with fury: boycotting the 1980 Moscow Olympics, imposing grain embargos, and authorizing covert support for Afghan resistance fighters. The SALT II treaty, signed in June 1979, was never ratified by the US Senate. The fragile accommodation of the 1970s had collapsed.

What followed was a second, sharper Cold War confrontation. Ronald Reagan, elected in 1980, explicitly rejected détente's premises. He described the Soviet Union as an "evil empire" in 1983 and announced the Strategic Defense Initiative — a missile defense program that the Soviets feared could neutralize their nuclear deterrent. Military spending on both sides accelerated. Soviet-American relations in the early 1980s were, by some measures, more hostile than they had been in the 1950s.

Yet the confrontation contained the seeds of its own resolution. Soviet economic performance was deteriorating sharply. The Afghan war was becoming a bleeding wound. And within the Soviet leadership, there were figures who understood that the system required fundamental change — not just tactical adjustment. The long stalemate was approaching its end, though almost no one in 1984 could see it.

Détente and the Long Stalemate: Accommodation Without Resolution

// COMMENTS

ON THIS PAGE